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ABS1RACT 
This paper presents a static game theoretic model of a firm's 
decision to adopt a technological innovation of uncertain profitabilty 
which will reduce the production cost associated with the firm's 
output. Given the levels of adoption costs, discount rates and 
expectations regarding the prof itabilty of the innovation, we 
determine the (Nash equilibrium) range of initial production costs for 
which each firm prefers to adopt the innovation. In addition, we ask 
whether a high-cost or a low-cost firm will be more likely to 
innovate, and whether a firm will be more likely to innovate if its 
rival is a high-cost or a low-cost firm. 
TECHNOLOGY ADOPI'ION UNDER IMPERFECT AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 
Jennifer F. Reinganum 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents a static game theoretic model of a firm's 
decision to adopt a technological innovation which is expected to 
reduce the production cost associated with the firm's output. The 
firm is assumed to share the market for the homogeneous output with 
one rival firm which faces the same decision problem regarding the 
innovation. There may be firm-specific or innovation-specific 
uncertainty regarding the profitability of the innovation (i.e., the 
extent of cost reduction) , and uncertainty regarding the cost of 
adoption for the rival firm. Moreover, the decision problem is 
modeled as a simultaneous-move game so each firm must act in ignorance 
of its rival's intentions. 
Basic notation is developed in Section II. Section Ill 
discusses the following questions in the context of a Nash 
equilibrium. Given the levels of adoption costs, discount rates and 
expectations regarding the profitability of the innovation, for what 
range of initial production costs will each firm prefer to adopt the 
innovation rather than forego adoption? Given the rival's initial 
production cost, will a high-cost firm or a low-cost firm be more 
likely to adopt the innovation? Given its own production cost, will a 
firm be more likely to innovate if its rival is a high-cost or a low-
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cost firm? What are the comparative static effects of a change in the 
level of adoption costs, discount rates or expectations about the 
profitability of the innovation? Section IV examines Bayesian 
equilibrium in a game of incomplete information where the rival's 
adoption costs are unknown. The analysis of this model follows that 
of Section III. Section V discusses the possibility of extending th� 
static models to a dynamic one involving a sequence of innovations and 
places this model in the context of related literature. 
II. BASIC NOTATION
Suppose that two firms currently produce a homogeneous good. 
They compete in a market characterized by Cournot-Nash quantity-
setting behavior. Firm i produces at a constant unit cost of mi·
This generates profits for i at the rate ri(m) = ri(n;_.mz
>. If Pi is
firm i's rate of discount, then ni(m) = ri(m) /(1-pi) represents the
present value of the firm's profits using its current technology. 
Suppose that an alternative technology becomes available to firm i at 
a cost of ki. Firm i is uncertain about the extent of the cost
reduction the innovation will provide, but believes that the random 
variable ci, representing the unit cost using the new technology, is
drawn from an interval Mi= [£i'ci
] according to the distribution
F.(.) .  If M. = M. and F.(·) = F.(·) , we will say that the uncertainty 1 1 J 1 J 
is innovation-specific. If M. # M. and F.(·) FF.(·) , or if 1 J 1 J 
M. = M. but F.(·) FF.(·) , then the uncertainty will be termed firm-1 J 1 J 
specific. 
Adoption costs may differ across firms due to firm-specific 
characteristics such as implementation and adjustment costs. These 
characteristics may also give rise to firm-specific uncertainty. 
However, it is assumed that both firms share the same beliefs 
regarding Mi and Fi' i = 1 ,2.
Assumption 1.  Suppose that Fi is strictly increasing on Mi.
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Assumption 2 . ri(�,�) (and hence ni(�,�)) is bounded, nonnegative.
and twice continuously differentiable with 
(a) ari/ilmi < O;
(b) ilri/ilmj > O; and
2 
(c ) a ri/ilmiamj < 0 
for all (II]_.�) e � x �· The Appendix discusses circumstances under·
which Assumption 2 can be expected to hold. 
Since the extent of cost reduction is uncertain. the prob,lem 
is characterized by imperfect information. If, in addition, firm i is 
uncertain about the value of firm j' s adoption costs k., we will say 
J 
that the problem is characterized by imperfect and incomplete 
information (Harsanyi, 1 967-8). Although this is a static model, it 
is useful to describe the following timing conventions so as to 
clarify the informational assumptions. For the game with complete but 
imperfect information, both firms know 
m = <11]_.�). P1 • p2• F1 • F2 • k1 and k2 at the beginning of the period.
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'In the middle of the period both firms simultaneously decide whether 
or not to adopt the new technology. At the end of the period if any 
firm has chosen to adopt the new technology, its new unit cost -- the 
random variable c. -- is realized and the payoffs are collected.1 In1 
the game with incomplete information, the same conventions apply 
except that only ki is known initially by firm i; kj is not known by,
and is never revealed to, firm i. In what follows, the current costs 
m will be treated as state variables; dependence of the firms' 
decisions upon the remaining parameters will be suppressed except 
where it is useful in clarifying the underlying informational 
assumptions or when performing comparative static analysis. 
III. lHE GAME WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION 
In this section we present a formal model of the economic 
problem outlined in Section II. 
Definition 1. A strategy for firm i in the game with complete 
information is a function di: � x � -> [0,1] . The expression di(m)
specifies the probability that i adopts the innovation when current 
costs are m = (II]_.�).
The payoff to firm 1 when the firms play strategies 
d(m) = Cd1Cm),d2 (m)) is denoted v
1Cm, d(m)). For given d(m),
1 . It should be pointed out that the ' ' adoption' ' decision is 
reversible ; if the firm discovers that the new technology is actually 
inferior, it need not implement the new technology. Thus the 
term ' ' adoption' ' is to be understood in this limited sense; the firm 
may stop short of full implementation. 
5 
v1cm,d(m)) = d1(m)d2(m)v
1Cm,l,1)
+(1 - d1(m))d2(m)v
1Cm,0,1) + d1(m)(l - d2(m)v
1Cm,1,0)
+(l - d1(m))(l - d2(m))v
1Cm,0,0). (1)
Thus the payoff for any strategy pair (d1(m),d2(m)) is a 
weighted average of the payoffs obtainable from playing the degenerate 
strategies d.(m) = 0 (i.e. , don't adopt) and d-(m) = 1 (i. e., adopt J J 
with certainty). These degenerate strategy payoffs are 
v1(m,1,0) 
v1cm, 0 ,1) 
v1cm,1,1>
V1 (m,O ,0) rl (m) + P1n1 (m)
rl(m) + P1 � n1<c1•Dii)dF1<c1>£1 
+ P1Cl-F1<mi>>n1(m) - k1 
rl(m) + P1 r n1<mi.c2)dF2<c2>
� 
+ P1Cl-F2(Dii))n1(m) 
rl(m) + P1 � r n1<c1,c2)dF1<c1>dF2<c2>
£1 £i 
+ P1<l-F1<mi» r n1<mi.c2)dF2<c2>
� 
+ P1Cl-F2(Dii)) smi n1<c1•Dii)dF1<c1>
£1 
+ P1Cl-F1<mi>lC1-F2(Dii))n1(m) - t1.
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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These are easily interpreted. Equation (2) says that the 
payoff to firm 1 if neither firm adopts the new technology is the flow 
profit r1(m) plus the present value of future profits under the 
current technology P1n1(m). Equation (3) gives firm l's payoff net of
adoption costs given that firm 2 retains the current technology and 
firm 1 adopts the innovation. The term P1<1-F1<mi>>n1(m) allows for
the possibility that the new production process is more costly than 
the current one. In this event, firm 1 reverts to the less costly 
technology. Note that this event may have probability zero. Equation 
(4) gives firm l's payoff when firm 2 adopts the new technology and 
firm 1 retains its current production process. Finally, if both adopt 
the new technology firm l's expected profits net of adoption costs are 
given by equation (5). Firm 2's payoffs are defined in the obvious
way. 
Definition 2. Given�. k2, p1, p2, F1 and F2, a strategy pair
(d�(·},d;(·}) is a Nash equilibrium if for all m e M1 x Mi•
_..1 * * __ 1 * (a) V-(m,dl(m),d2(m)) 2. v-(m,dl(m),d2(m)) 
for all strategies d1(·); and 
_2 * * _2 * (b) V-(m,d1(m),d2(m)) 2. V-(m,d1(m),d2(m)) 
for all strategies d2(·). 
A standard approach at this point is to attempt to determine 
firm l's best response to an arbitrary strategy for firm 2. 
Unfortunately, with no information regarding the form of the 
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opponent's strategy, this direct approach is not particularly useful. 
Instead we will go about characterizing the Nash equilibrium in a 
rather roundabout way. 
Define 
�1Cm) - k1 = v1cm,l,O) - v1cm,0,0)
= P1smi ln1<c1.mz> - n1<m:i..mz>JdF1<c1> - k1.
.£.1 
( 6) 
The expression �1( m) represents the gain to firm 1 due to
adoption of the innovation if firm 2 were to use the decision rule 
d2( m) = O; i.e. , don't adopt. Note that �1( m) > 0 for all 111:1. > £1 and
�1(£1,mz> = 0 for all mz· In addition
a�1/a� = -p1F1C�>an1( m)/a� > o (7) 
and 
a�1!amz = p� [an1Cc1,mz>lamz - a n1C�.mzllamz1dF1Cc1) > 0 (8)
.£.1 
by assumptions 2( a) and 2( c), respectively. 1hat is, if firm 2 were 
to eschew adoption, then the net value of adoption to firm 1 is 
greater the greater are initial costs ( 11)_,mz>. 
Define 
o1Cm> - k1 = v1cm,l ,ll - v1cm,O,ll
P1 smi [n1<c1• mz> - n1<m:i..mz>JdF1<c1>
£1 
+pl smi J°2 [n1<c1,c2> - n1<c1,mz> - n1<m:i.,c2> £1 £2 
+ n1( lll:l.•°2)]dF1dF2 - kl. 
The expression 61( m) represents the gain to firm 1 from
adopting the innovation if firm 2 where to choose the strategy 
d2( m) = l; that is, adopt with certainty. Note that 
6l( m) = �l( m) + P1 smi j°2 [nl( cl,c2) - n1<c1.mz>
.£.1 £z 
- n1C�,c2l + n1c�.mzl1dF1dF2• 
Assumption 2( c) implies that the second term of ( 10) is 
negative for all (�·mz> > (£1,£2). 1hus �1( m) > 61( m) for all 
<11)_.mzl > (£1,£2). Moreover, 61( �,£2> = �1<�,£2> for all 111:1. and
61<£1.mzl = �1<£1.mzl = 0 for all mz· 1his implies that if firm 1 
chooses to adopt, its gain is greater if firm 2 chooses to forego 
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(9) 
( 10) 
adoption than if firm 2 chooses. to adopt as well. 1hus firm 1 always 
prefers that firm 2 forego adoption of the new technology. For
<11)_.mz> > <.£.1 ·£2>. 
�1Cm) > j°2 �1c�,c2ldF2
£z 
P1smi j°2 [n1<c1.mz> - nl( �·mzl1dFldF2.
£z .£.1 
Thus for (II]_,�) > (£1,£2> 
o1(m) > � � Cn1Cc1,c2) - n1(�,c2)]dF1dF2 > 0
£i � 
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by assumption 2(a). The dependence Of o1(m) On m1,mi is summarized
below. 
ao1/a� = - p1F1C�)(l-F2(�))an1Cm)/a� 
-P1F1C�)�[an1c�,c2)/a�]dF2 > o 
� 
by assumption 2(a). In addition, 
ao1/a� = p1c1-F2C�))� Can1Cc1,�l/a�
£1 
- an1C�,�)/a�ldF1 > o 
(11) 
( 12) 
by assumption 2(c). If firm 2 chooses the strategy ''certainly adopt,'' 
then firm l's gain due to adoption is greater the greater are initial 
costs (II]_·�)· 
The value of adoption to firm 1 (net of adoption costs) given 
an arbitrary strategy d2(m) for firm 2 is
v
1
Cm,l,d2(m)) - v1cm,O,d2Cm))
= d2(m)o1Cm) + (l-d2Cm))�1Cm) - k1
= �1(m) + d2(m)Co1(m) - �1Cm)] - k1• (13) 
Define µ1(m,d2) = �1(m) + d2Co1(m) - �1(m)]. Clearly 
ol(m) i µl(m,d2) i �l(m) for all (m,d2>·
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Given an arbitrary strategy for firm 2, d2(-), a best response
for firm 1 is to adopt the innovation if µ1(m,d2(m)) > k1, to forego
adoption if µ1(m,d2(m)) < k1 and to do either (or, alternatively, to 
randomize) if µ1(m,d2(m)) = k1• Rather than attempting to 
characterize this best response directly, we consider the set 
s� = (m 8 MI ol(m) >kl}. Since ol(m) i µl(m,d2) for all (m,d2), if
m s S�, then µ1Cm,d2(m)) > k1 so regardless of d2, firm 1 should play
the strategy d�(m) = 1. Thus for m 8 s�. firm 1 has the dominant
• strategy d1 = 1, implying that firm 1 should definitely adopt the
innovation if me S� . We can characterize the boundary of
1 1 s1, as1 {m 8 M I ol(m) =kl}' as follows.
Assumption 3. o1c;1,£2) - k1 > O. 
Under Assumption 3, o1c;1,mi> > k1 for all mi e Mi· Since
01(£1·�) = 0 <kl for all � £Mi and aol/a� > 0, for each mi there
exists ml(�) 8 (£1,;1> such that ol(�(�),�) = k1· Moreover since
ao11a� > o,
&;;1 dm1 -ao11ami 
-
=-I = < o.dm2 � o1Cm> = k1 ao1/a�
Similarly, define s� = {m £MI �l(m) <kl}. Since
(14) 
µl(m,d2) i �l(m) for all (m,d2)' m £ s� implies µl(m,d2) <kl so that
regardless of d2, firm 1 should play d� = O. Thus for m e S�, firm 1
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has the dominant strategy d� = O. For m a S�, firm 1 doesn't want to
adopt eyen if it knows that firm 2 yill not adopt. The boundary of 
s� . as� = {m 8 M I �l(m) = k1}· can be characterized as follows. 
Since �1<�1,£2) = o1Cc1,£2), it follows fran Assumption 3 that 
- -
�1Cc1,£2> > k1 which implies �1Cc1,�) > k1 for all �· Since
�1<£1,�> = 0 < k1 for all � and a�1/a� > 0, for each � there 
exists ;1(82) a (£1,�1) such that �1(�(82),82) = k1, with 
dm1 dm1 -a�11a� 
- =  - I
= < o. 
dm2 � �1 Cm) = k1 a�1fami (15) 
Moreover, the locus �1(m) = k1 lies everywhere to the left of the 
locus ol(m) = kl except at 82 = £2· where the loci coincide. This can 
be summarized graphically as in Figure 1.
The inner strip remains to be characterized, but we can note 
-1 -1 -that for m i s0 U s1 (where S denotes the closure of the set S), a 
best response for firm 1 to d2 = 1 is d1 = 0, and a best response for 
firm 1 to d2 = 0 is d1 = 1. More information can be garnered by
performing the analogous analysis for firm 2. Graphed in (II]_,�)
space, this analysis is summarized in Figure 2.
In the inner strip (that is, for m i � U si), we have
�2Cm) > k2 and o2Cm) < k2• That is, firm 2 prefers to adopt the
innovation if firm 1 foregoes adoption and to forego adoption if firm 
1 adopts. 
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Superimposing Figures 1 and 2 indicates that there are
potentially three types of Nash equilibria: type (1) wherein both 
firms have dominant strategies; type (2) wherein a single firm has a 
dominant strategy and the other plays a best response; and type (3) 
wherein no firm has a dominant strategy. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3 with an underline indicating that the strategy is dominant. 
The central region possesses two pure strategy equilibria. In 
addition, it possesses a mixed strategy equilibrium. For each m in 
the central region, �i(.m) 2. ki while 6i(m) i ki' and �i(m) > .Si(m), i
= 
1,2. If d; is firm 2's strategy, then firm 1 will be willing to 
1 • -� •) randomize if and only if V (m,1,d2) = v-(m,O,d2 • 
only if 
• �1Cm) + d2Cm)£o1(m) - �1Cm)] - k1 
or equivalently 
That is, if and 
0 
• d2 = [�l(m) - kl]/[�l(m) - 61(m)].
• Notice that 0 i d2(m) i 1 so long as �1(m) - k1 2. 0 and
ol(m) i �; but these are true for all m in the central region.
Analogous analysis of firm 2's willingness to randomize yields 
d�(m) = C�2(m) - k2J/C�2(m) - o2Cm)].
It is easy to show that, in the central region, firm 1 prefers the 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
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pure strategy equilibrium ( 1,0) to the randomized strategy 
equilibrium, ·which is preferred by firm 1 to the pure strategy 
equilibrium ( 0,1). Of course, firm l's preferences over these three 
equilibria are precisely opposite to those of firm 1. 
The boundaries as� and asi , which are of measure zero in
� x Mz • may be arbitrarily assigned to the adjacent regions. Thus
the following proposition has been established. 
Proposition 1. The following policy is a Nash equilibrium strategy 
for firm 1. 
·�(m) =�:•2'"' - •2lil•2<•> - •2<mll 
-1 m £ Ri 
1 m £ Rio
-1\-1 -1m £RO R]:nR0
where the regions Ri, �O and R� are as shown in Figure 4. 
The other policy in the Nash equilibrium is 
.;,., =�'.·''"' - •,111,,<•> - •1<mll
-2 m £ R1 
2 
m £ Rio 
m 2 � \Hin� 
It is clear that Rio = �o· The map of the Nash equilibrium pair
• • ( d1,d2) is shown in Figure S. 
( 19) 
( 20) 
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Consider the effect of a marginal increase in current costs m 
. . . upon di(m). Form£ R� or m £Rt it is clear that a marginal increase
. . in either� or � leaves di(m) unchanged. Form£ Rto• 
• 2 ad/ami = C<11i - 6i><a11/ami) - <11i - ki>a<11i - 6i)/amiH11i - 6i>
[( ki - 6i>a11/ami + <11i
2 
ki)a6i/ami)J/(11i - 6i> 
. . Since ki > 6i and 1\i > ki for m £ R{o• adi/ami > O.
. . . . . . Similarly, adi/amj > O form 2 R{o· Thus form£ R{ UR� U B{o• di(m)
is locally increasing in m1 and �· However, it is apparent from 
Figure 4 that there are portions of the boundary of �O where a
• marginal increase in either� or � causes d1(m) to decrease. These 
portions consist of the curves from a to b and c to d in Figure 4. 
Thus d�(m) possesses no global monotonicity properties. Consequently, 1 
the questions posed at the beginning of this paper (Given the rival's 
initial production cost, will a high-cost firm or a low-cost firm be 
more likely to adopt the innovation? Given its own production cost, 
will a firm be more likely to innovate if its rival is a high-cost or 
a low-cost firm?) cannot be answered unambigously. However, the 
following qualified statements can be made as corollaries to 
Proposition 1. 
Corollary 1. If initial costs (�,111z> are sufficiently high ( low)
then both ( neither) of the firms will adopt the new technology. 
Corollary 2. If one firm's initial costs are sufficiently high and 
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the other firm's costs are sufficiently low, then the high-cost firm 
will adopt the new technology and the low-cost firm will not. 
Corollary 2 is the most interesting from the point of view of 
industrial organization. It says that if costs are too disparate, the 
high-cost firm will be the one to adopt the new technology. Thus in 
this framework there is a tendency toward more equal-sized firms 
rather than a tendency toward monopolization of the industry. This is 
despite the fact that the low-cost firm has a greater market share on 
which to gain by cost-reduction. Essentially, if the low-cost firm 
(say firm j) has costs which are sufficiently close to £.j' then the
new technology is much less likely to provide a (sufficiently) better 
technology, one which justifies the outlay of kj. 
Although the pattern of the Nash equilibrium strategies seems 
complex enough as it is, an implicit simplifying assumption has been 
made in Figures 1-5. Since the loci �l (m) .:: kl and o1 (m) .:: k1 each.
intersect the loci �2(m) = kl and o2(m) = k2 at least once. they 
divide � x � into at least 9 regions as in Figure 3. However, these · 
loci may have multiple intersections. In this case, the adoption and 
nonadoption sets need not be connected. Nevertheless, the foregoing 
analysis is sufficient to characterize the Nash equilibrium pattern. 
This is illustrated in Figure 6 where the shaded region indicates 
randomization. 
In order to examine comparative static effects, let us 
explicitly denote the dependence of the sets R�, if and llf0 upon k and
-i -i i P by RQ<k1,k2, P1·P2>• RJ:<k1, k2, P1·P2> and R1o<k1•ki• P1.P2>• i
We will rely upon the following trivial lemmas to characterize 
comparative static effects. 
1,2. 
Lemma A.
(that is, 
me R�(k1, k2, p1, p2> if and only if either (Al) �i(m) i ki
o is a dominant strategy for i); or {A2) o.(m) L k. and
J J 
oi(m) i ki (that is, 1 is a dominant strategy for j and 0 is a best
response for i). 
Lemma B. m e Rt<k1, k2, P1·P2> if and only if either (Bl) oi(m) L ki
(that is, 1 is a dominant strategy for i), or (B2) �. (m) < k. andJ - J 
�i(m) L ki (that is, 0 is a dominant strategy for j and 1 is a best
response for i). 
Lemma C. m e �0Ck1, k2, p1, p2> if and only if both (Cl)
�i(m) > k. > o.(m) and (C2) �.(m) > k. > o.(m).1 1 J J J 
• 
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Proposition 2. di(m) either decreases or remains the same in response
to an increase in ki (or, equivalently, a decrease in Pi).
• Consider the impact of an increase in k1 upon d1(m). The
• claim that d1(m) is nonincreasing in k1 is equivalent to the following. 
two claims. 
Claim 1. m e R�(k1,k2, p1, p2) implies m e R�(k�, k2,p1, p2) for all
0 kl L kl.
Claim 2. m e Rio<k1, k2,p1, p2) implies that there does not exist
0 -1 0 k1 l k1 such that ms R1Ck1.k2,p1.p2). Moreover, if
1 0 • m B R10Ck1,k2,p1.p2), then d1(m) is unaffected.
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Proof of Claim 1. m B R�Ck1.�,p1,p2) implies either (a) �1Cm) i k1 or
(b) o2Cm) L k2 and o1Cml i �by Lemma A. If (a) holds at �· then
(a) holds for all � l k1• If (b) holds at �· again (b) holds a
fortiori for all k� l k1• Lemma A then implies that
-1 0 0 ms R0Ck1.k2,p1.p2) for all k1 l k1•
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 2. m s Hio<k1,k2,p1.p2) implies both (a) �2Cm) > k2
and (b) o1(m) < k1• Suppose. contrary to Claim 2, that there exists
0 -1( 0 k ) k1 l k1 such that m s Ri k1• 2•P1.P2 • Then Lemma B states that 
either (c) �2(m) i k2 and �l l k� or (d) ol(m) l �· Since (c)
contradicts (a) and (d) contradicts (b) whenever k� l k1, we are
forced to conclude that there does not exist k� l k1 such that
ms ii<k�,k2,p1,p2). The last statement of Claim 2 follows trivially
from equation (19). 
O.E.D. 
Proposition 3. 
. . (a) If mi R{0Ck1,k2,p1,p2), then di(m) either increases or
remains the same in response to an increase in kj (or, equivalently, a
decrease in P.).
J 
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. . (b) If m B R:0Ck1,k2,p1.p2). then di(m) may either increase or
decrease in response to an increase in k. (or, equivalently, aJ 
decrease in p. ). 
J 
Proposition 3(a) is equivalent to Claim 3 below, for i = 1. 
Claim 4 below is a more precise statement of Proposition 3(b) , for i = 
1. 
Claim 3. -1 -1 0 ms R1Ck1,k2,p1,p2l implies that ms R1Ck1,k2,p1,p2) for all
0 k2 l k2. 
Claim 4. m s Ri0Ck1,k2,p1.p2> implies that there does not exist
0 -1 0 k2 l k2 such that ms R0Ck1,k2.P1,p2>. However, if
m B �0Ck1,k�,p1,p2), then d�(m) decreases with an increase in k2•
Proof of Claim 3. m s ii<k1,k2,p1,p2l implies that either (a)
o
1(m) l k1 or (b) �2Cm) i k2 and �l l �by Lemma A. An increase in
k2 has no effect upon (a) while (b) holds a fortiori for all k� l k2•
-1 0 Thus ms R1Ck1,k2.p1, p2>. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 4. m s R�0Ck1,k2,p1,p2) implies both (a) �1(m) > k1
and (b) o2Cm) < k2• Suppose, contrary to Claim 4 ,  that there exists
0 -1( 0 " ) k2 l k2 such that m & R0 k1, k2.�1.p2 • Then either (c) �1(m) 2. k1 or 
(d) o2(m
) 2. k� and ol(m) i kl. But (c) contradicts (a) and (d)
contradicts (b) for all k� 2. k2. Thus there does not exist k� 2. k2 
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such that me R�(k1,k�.p1,p2). The final statement of Claim 4 follows 
from equation (19). 
• 3d1(m)/3k2 = -l/(�2(m) - o2Cm)) < O. 
Q.E.D. 
We are now equipped to describe the impact of an increase in 
firm l's adoption costs from k1 to k� upon the Nash equilibrium 
• • 1 strategy pair (d1(m),d2(m)). If mi RJ:0Ck1,�.p1.p2) or 
me �0Ck1,k2.p1.p2> but mi iG:0<k�,k2,p1.p2). then firm 1 is no more
likely to adopt and firm 2 is no less likely to adopt. However, if 
m e R�0Ck1,k2.p1.p2> and m e �0Ck�.k2,p1.p2Y. then although firm 1
randomizes using the same probability as before, firm 1 now faces 
higher costs of adoption and is willing to randomize only if firm 2 
lowers its probability of adoption. Thus in this case firm 1 is 
precisely as likely to adopt, while firm 2 is less likely to adopt. 
IV. THE GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In this section we will make an alternative assumption 
regarding the information the firms possess when making their 
decisions. Suppose that firm i knows its own adoption costs ki but
not kj. firm j's adoption costs. This results in a game of incomplete
information (Harsanyi, 1967-8). Using Harsanyi's reinterpretation of 
incomplete information as complete but imperfect information, we 
assume that the firms are Bayesian players with the same prior beliefs 
regarding the distributions of k1 and k2, now regarded as random 
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variables. That is, both firms believe that the adoption cost 
parameters k1, k2 are drawn (independently, for simplicity) from the 
intervals K1 = [Jo,1.�] and K2 = CJo,2.�1 according to the distributions
G1(·) and G2(. ), respectively. Firm i observes the random variable ki
before it selects its strategy; firm i does not observe k . •  Therefore 
J 
a strategy for i may be contingent upon k., but not k. . This1 J 
informational assumption is emphasized by the definition of a strategy 
given below. 
Definition 3. A strategy for firm i in the game with incomplete 
information is a function 6i: Hi x� x Ki -> [0,1]. The expression
6i(m,ki) represents the probability that firm i will adopt the
innovation when current costs are m = (�·�) and firm i's adoption
costs are ki.
Since firm 1 cannot observe k2 and knows that firm 2 cannot
observe k1, firm 1 can only make conjectures about what action firm 2
will take. These conjectures cannot depend upon k2 since firm 1 can't 
observe k2; nor can they depend upon k1 since firm 2's actual behavior
cannot depend upon k1 and so l's conjectures about 2's behavior should
not depend upon information which firm 2 itself could not possibly 
possess in making its own decision. Thus firm l's conjectures about 
firm 2's behavior can depend only upon current costs m. Define 
P2(m) Pr1{firm 2 adopts given ml
to be firm l's conjecture regarding firm 2's probability of adoption. 
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Similarly, define P1(m) to be firm 2 's conjectures about l's
probability of adoption when current costs are m. Then the expected 
value of adoption by firm 1 (gross of adoption costs) , given firm l's 
conjectures, is 
µ1(m,p2
)
= p2(m) o1Cm
) + (1 - p2(m) ) �1(m)
= �1(m) + p2(m) [o1(m) - �1(m) ] > O (21) 
for�> £1• For given �· firm 1 prefers to adopt if µ1(m,p2
) < k1
and is indifferent if µ1(m,p2
) = k1• Thus an optimal decision rule
for firm 1 contingent upon its coniectures p2(m) is 
'
1'" ·"1 ·•2
<•>> -��0.1] 
µl(m,p2) >kl
µl(m,p2) =kl (22
) 
µl(m,p2
) <kl
Before k1 is revealed to firm 1 , this contingent decision rule
for firm 1 would generate an adoption probability for firm 1 of 
Pr{µ1(m,p2) 2. k1) = 61(µ1(m,p2(m) ) ) .
Def ini ti on 4 . • • The conjectures (p1 (·) ,p2 (.
) )  are consistent if, for
all m s � x �·
• 
P1 (m
)
and 
• 
P2 (m
)
61 (µl (m,p;(m) ) )
6 ( 
• 
2 µ2(m,pl(m
) ) ) . 
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That is, conjectures are consistent if they might arise from 
rational expectations on the parts of the firms. 
• • 
Definition 5. A strategy pair (61, 62
) is a Bayesian equilibrium if
for all m s � x � and for all k1 s K1, k2 s K2,
and 
• 
61 (m, k1
)
• 
62(m, k2
)
• 
fl (m, k1,p2
(m) )
• 
f2(m, k2,p1 (m
) ) .
That is, a Bayesian equilibrium is a pair of optimal decision 
rules which are based on consistent conjectures. 
In general, finding a pair of consistent conjectures is 
equivalent to finding a fixed point of the mapping Tp1(m) , where T is
iefined by Tp1 (m
) = 61(µ1(m,62(µ2(m,p1(m
) ) ) ) ) , in a function space.
This is quite difficult, especially with no information about the 
distribution functions 61,62• However, the following result is easily
'st a bl ished. 
Proposition 4 .  Suppose that 6i(·) is uniform on Ki and suppose that
and 
min oi (m
) 2. £i m 
max �i (m
) i ki m ' 
i = 1 ,2. That is, if ki = 
£
i' then firm i will adopt the innovation
for all m even if firm j is certain to do so as well ; and if ki = ki
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then fiElll i will never adopt the innovation, even if fiElll j foregoes 
it also. Then there exists a unique pair of consistent conjectures 
• • ( P1 (.). P2 (. )) • 
Proof. Gi(ki) = (ki - ki)/AKi' where AKi = ki - ki· Applying the
definition of consistent conjectures yields the equations 
and 
• pl
• 
[�l - k1 + P2<61 - �l)]/AKl
• • 
P2 = [�2 - kz + P1<62 - �2)]/AK2
• • which can be uniquely solved for (p1,p2):
and 
• 
P1 
• 
P2 
AK2<�1 - ki> - (�1 - 61><�2 - k2) 
AKlAKl - (�1 - 61><�2 - 62>
AK1(�2 - k2) - (�2 - 62><�1 - kl)
AK1AK2 - (�l - 61><�2 - 62> 
where the dependence of �i' 6i and pi on m is implicit.
• To see that 0ip1(m)i1, note that the numerator
AK2<�1 - k1> - <�1 - 61><�2 - k2> l o 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
because AK2 l �2
- kz and �l - ]!;1 l �l - 61 for all m. In addition,
the denominator 
AK1AK2 - (�1 - 61><�2 - 62> > O 
since AK1 > �l - 61 and AK2 > �2 - 62 for all m; finally, the 
numerator never exceeds the denominator. 
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AK1AK2 - (�l - 61)(�2 - 62> - AK2(�1 - kl) + (�l - 61><�2 - k2)
= AK2(k1 - �1) + < �1 - 61><62 - £2> L 0
under the hypotheses of Proposition 4 .  
Q.E.D. 
We can conclude that the Nash equilibrium value function for fiElll 1 is 
v1*cm,kl) =max {p;(m)v
1(m,1,l) + (l-p;(m))v1(m,1,0),
p;(m)v1(m,0,1) + (1 - p;(m))v1(m,0,0).
(27) 
• 1* Unfortunately, the dependence of p1 and V upon � and mz is
comp! ica ted. 
• 2 -ap1/ami = (1/D) {D[(a�1/ami)(k2 - �2> + Ca61/ami><�2 - £2>
+ <61 - �1>a�2/amil - Ni[dD]J,
• where Ni is the numerator of pi and D is the denominator. All terms
in this expression are positive with the exception of 
C61 - �1>a�2/ami < O. Thus although it seems likely that
• ap1/ami > 0, i = 1,
2, this cannot be directly established.
• 
_ _l • • If we could establish that ap2/a� > 0,  it follows that v-- 1s 
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decreasing in � · 
av1* 1am. 1 (ap;/ami) cv1cm,l,l) - v1cm,l,0)) (28) 
• 
• _..1 • 1 + p2av-cm,l,l)/ami + (1 - p2>av (m,1,0)/ami
for µ1(m,p2(m)) > k1, and
av1* 1am. 1 (ap;/ami>cv1cm,O,l) - v1cm,O,Oll
+ p;av1cm,O,l)/ami + Cl • 1 p2lav (m,0,0)/ami
(29) 
• 
for µ1Cm,p2Cm)) < k1• Each term of these expressions is negative for
i = 1 and the continuity of v1* implies that v1* is decreasing in � ·
A similar analysis for i = 2 does not permit us to conclude
th t Vl• . . . . . a 1s 1ncreas1ng 1n �· since the term 
V1(m,d1,l) - v
1Cm,d1,0) < 0 for d1 = 0, 1 while av
1Cm,d1,d2)/a� > 0
for d1 = 0,1 and d2 = 0,1. 
V. EXTENSIONS AND RELATED LITERAllJRE
A deterministic model of the adoption of an innovation (the 
telephone) which is assumed to generate positive externalities in 
consumption is developed by Rholfs (1974). Dybvig and Spatt (1980) 
extend and generalize the analysis of innovations which produce 
positive externalities. They discuss the means by which government 
can promote adoption of such innovations. They also address these 
questions in a model with negative externalities. The case of cost-
reducing innovation is such a model if we consider only the 
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preferences of the two firms and not those of consumers. However, the 
Dybvig-Spatt results are inapplicable to our case of cost-reducing 
innovation since their assumptions (b) and (c) (p. 22) both fail to
�old, even when the profitablity of the innovation is known. If we 
consider the preferences of consumers and the two firms, then adoption 
by one firm provides a positive externality to consumers and a 
uegative externality to the rival firm. A model of innovation 
adoption which allows one agent's actions to simultaneously generate 
negative externalities for some agents and positive externalities for 
other agents is that of Allen (1980). Using an alternative
equilibrium concept, and under the hypothesis that each agent strictly 
randomizes, Allen proves the existence of a unique equilibrium 
distribution function describing the likelihood that each possible 
user set will occur. 
A deterministic model involving a sequence of innovations is 
developed in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). In this model the
population grows at an exogenous rate, increasing the demand for the 
product and providing a growing incentive for cost-reducing 
innovation. Technical advance is assumed to take place continuously, 
but innovation -- the adoption of a new technology -- occurs only at 
discrete intervals due to the fixed cost associated with 
implementation. Since Dasgupta and Stiglitz allow their firms to 
innovate only once, there is no externality generated by the 
concurrent adoption decision of a rival firm. Instead, each firm 
simply selects a date at which it innovates and enters the industry, 
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taking the time paths of demand, (feasible) unit production costs and 
adoption costs, as well as the innovation dates of the other firms, as 
given. Dasgupta and Stiglitz suggest that such a framework admits a 
steady state such that innovation occurs at regular intervals and 
involves a constant rate of technical progress, the magnitudes of 
which are generated by the equilibrium play of the innovating firms. 
A stochastic model involving a sequence of innovations can be found in 
Balcer and Lippman (1980) . The innovations are generated in a manner 
which is exogenous to the industry, which consists of a single firm. 
The firm must decide whether (and when) to adopt the current best 
technology, the profitability of which is known, or to wait and adopt 
a later innovation. The firm is uncertain about both the timing and 
magnitude of future innovations. 
The present paper is most closely related to that of Jensen 
(1980) . In Jensen's model, two firms decide, for each of a finite 
number of decision periods, whether or not to adopt an innovation of 
uncertain profitability. Each is uncertain about the innovation's 
value (''good'' or ''bad'') and about the opponent's prior assessment 
that the innovation is ''good.'' Each period an external source 
provides a signal regarding the value of the innovation and priors are 
updated upon the basis of the information received that period. At 
first glance, this model appears to be dynamic. However, certain 
assumptions regarding the extreme myopia of the firms effectively 
reduces this to finitely many strategically independent static games 
linked together by a Bayesian updating rule. 
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In Jensen's model, the innovation is either ''good'' or 
''bad. '' Tb.at is, if the innovation were known to be ''good'' then a 
firm would adopt it irrespective of its rival's decision. 
Alternatively, if the innovation were known to be ''bad'' then a firm 
would forego adoption regardless of its rival's decision. In this 
paper, in addition to these extreme possiblities, we admit the case 
wherein, if the profitability of the innovation were known, the value 
of adopting it still depends upon the rival's action. Even if an 
innovation is worth adopting if the rival foregoes adoption, it may 
not be worth adopting if the rival also adopts it, since this reduces 
the extent of the adoption benefits. This is because there is a 
continuum of possible costs associated with the new technology. In 
Jensen, the adoption decision is irreversible; it is reversible in 
this paper. Tb.at is, the firm needn't use the new technology if it 
discovers that it is unprofitable. In Jensen, the imperfect 
information is innovation-specific; this model allows firm-specific 
imperfect information as well. Both models contain elements of 
incomplete information; in Jensen the rival's prior assessment of the 
probability that the innovation is ''good'' is unknown, while in this 
paper the rival's cost of adoption may be unknown. 
Finally, by considering initial costs as state variables, we 
are able to address questions of the sort discussed in the 
Introduction and in Section Ill, which is not done in Jensen (1980) . 
Moreover, this formulation is the natural one to use in an attempt to 
extend the static model to a dynamic model involving a sequence of 
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innovations. This would yield a dynamic, stochastic game theoretic 
model of the evolution of market structure as a result of technical 
advance. If we had been able to conclude from the model of Section IV 
that the Nash equilibrium value functions had inherited the properties 
of the profit functions described in Assumption 2, then we would be 
essentially finished. We could then extend the model recursively to 
an arbitrary finite number of innovations in the manner of dynamic 
programming. However, this goal appears to be out of reach at the 
moment since we cannot guarantee that these properties are inherited. 
One goal of future research in this area should be to determine 
reasonable sufficient conditions which would enable us to make the 
aforementioned extensions. 
APPENDIX 
SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR ASSUMPTIONS 2(a) - (b). 
Claim: Recall that ri(m) = (p(q1 
+ �) - mi)qi(m), where
(�(m),�(m)) is a Cour110t-Nash equilibrium. Then sufficient 
conditions for Assumptions 2(a)-(b)  to hold is that 
p' < 0 and p" qi + p' < O. 
Proof. The existence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium is treated 
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extensively elsewhere and will not be dealt with here. A Cour110t-Nash 
equilibrium (q1(m),q2(m)) must satisfy
and 
xi= p'qi 
+ P - mi= 0, i = 1 , 2,
x .. 11 p
"qi + 2p' < o. i = 1 .2.
Thus ar./am. = (p'aq./am. - l)q. and ar./am. = p'q.(aq./am.l.1 1  J 1 1 1 J 1 J  J 
Assuming that p' < 0, a sufficient condition for ari/ami < 0 is
aq./am. > O; and a sufficient condition for ar./am. > O isJ 1 1 J 
aq./am. < o.
J J 
Differentiating x1, x2 totally and solving for the desired
partial derivatives implies that 
aq/ami xjj/(xllx22 - x12x21) 
and 
aqi/amj 
= -xij/
(xllx 22 - x12x 21
>
·
where xij = p''qi + p'. Notice that if xij < 0 and p' < 0, then
l x .. I > I x .. I. Thus sufficient conditions for11 1J 
- -
aq./am. < 0 and aq./am. > 0, i = 1 , 2  ( i#j) are that1 1 1 J 
x. . < 0. i = 1,2 ( j#i) • 1J 
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Q.E.D. 
Assumption 2(c)  states that a2r./am.am. < O. Since1 1 J 
2 a r./am.am. = x .. (aq./am.)(aqj/am.)1 1 J lJ 1 1 J 
- - -
+ p' 'q.Caq./am.) Caq./am.l 1 J J J 1 
- 2-+ p' q.(a q./am.am.l.1 J 1 J 
it is clear that sufficient conditions for a2r./am.am. < 0 are more1 1 J 
complex. The first term is negative if x . . < O; the second term islJ 
negative if p'' > O. The third term is of unknown sign. However, 
Assumptions 2(a) - (c)  are easily shown to hold for the demand 
functions P = a - bln(q1 + �) (for ci i b), P = a - b(q1 + q2l
(for ci i a/2) and P = a +  b/Cq1 + q2) 
( for £i l a), where the
parameter restrictions are required for non-negativity of profits. 
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